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DYNAMICS OF BELGIAN PLURINATIONAL 
FEDERALISM: A SMALL STATE  
UNDER PRESSURE 
CÉLINE ROMAINVILLE* 
Abstract: This Essay outlines the dynamics of Belgian plurinational federalism. 
It focuses on the major driving forces of Belgian federalism by identifying the 
sources of change and instability, which are reshaping the institutional and con-
stitutional layers of Belgian federalism. It then analyzes the recent Reform of 
the State before reviewing the indirect and direct sources of change of Belgian 
constitutional law originating in European law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Belgium is a bipolar federal state “driven by a dynamic of dissociation” 
that rests on a complex system of multi-level powers.1 Before 1970, Belgium 
was governed as a unitary state in which sovereignty rested solely with the 
central government—an arrangement that often pitted the two major language 
communities (Dutch and French) against each other in a contest for control 
over national policy. Since 1970, a process called the “Reform of the State” 
has been underway, transforming Belgium into a double-layered federal state 
in which sovereignty is shared between the central government and sub-
national units delineated along cultural, linguistic, and territorial lines.2 This 
transformation was gradual, with amendments to the Belgian Constitution 
and the adoption of a series of so-called “Special Institutional Reform Acts” 
demarcating each stage.3 The end result of this process was the creation of a 
double-layered governing structure consisting of a central federal state and 
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 1 See Marc Verdussen, La Belgique: Un Fédéralisme Bipolaire mû par une Dynamique de 
Dissociation, in LE FÉDÉRALISME MULTINATIONAL: UN MODÈLE VIABLE? 211 (Michel Seymour 
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tions] of Aug. 8, 1980 MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 15, 1980, 
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sub-national federate entities comprised of cultural and linguistic “communi-
ties” as well as territorial “regions.”  
The two types of federate entities (communities and regions), each with 
its own legislative competency, coexist and overlap to a certain extent since 
they are defined according to different criteria—regions are defined by physi-
cal borders, whereas communities are defined according to a shared language 
and cultural tradition.4 The three regional federate entities (the Flemish Re-
gion, the Brussels-Capital Region and the Walloon Region) are empowered to 
legislate with respect to economic, environmental, planning, housing, and 
industrial issues in their territory.5 The three “communitarian” federate enti-
ties (the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the German-
speaking Community) are empowered to legislate with respect to linguistic, 
cultural, and educational matters within their respective communities.6 Bel-
gian constitutional law is very specific in defining the concept of “communi-
ties,” which encompasses both the people that form the community and the 
ties that bind them—the community’s language and culture—without regard 
to physical location.7 As a result, the decrees of the Flemish and the French 
Communities of Belgium apply not only to the Dutch–speaking and French–
speaking regions but also to “those institutions established in the bilingual 
region of Brussels-Capital which, because of their activities or organization, 
must be considered as belonging exclusively to one [language] Community or 
the other.”8 
In analyzing and explaining the contemporary pressures on Belgium, 
this Essay will focus on the system’s “dynamics.” For the purposes of this 
Essay, dynamics comprise the internal and external movements that animate 
Belgian federalism, specifically the pressures and driving forces existing in 
Belgian society, the political sphere, and even in the constitutional system 
itself. These dissociative forces are capable of either generating demands for 
constitutional reform or potentially threatening the entire constitutional sys-
tem. Dynamics, therefore, refers not only to sources of change but also to 
sources of grave instability.9  
Dynamics can also refer to sources of continuity when the forces at 
work result in a preservation of the status quo.10 Although particular sources 
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of change can theoretically be distinguished from the particular sources of 
continuity, the different sources of change and continuity usually interact 
within federal states, sometimes combining in ways that make distinguishing 
between the two classifications a matter of perspective.11 Whether particular 
forces are sources of change or sources of continuity, it can sometimes de-
pend on the timescale of one’s observations.12 According to Arthur Benz and 
Jörg Broschek:  
At least three general patterns [involving the interaction of change 
and continuity] can be distinguished: (1) continuity may be achieved 
“through change,” for example by institutional reform restoring a bal-
ance of powers or negative feedback mechanisms; (2) change may 
become continuous (“continuity of change” or evolution); [or] (3) a 
direction of a trajectory begins to change (“change of continuity”), 
leading to abrupt transformation or discontinuous evolution. 13  
It is important to note, however, the fact that federal systems are subject to 
change and continuity does not mean that those systems are necessarily un-
stable, “[r]ather it is dynamics, the ongoing dualism of continuity and change, 
which create a ‘sustainable’ federation.”14 Sources of change are therefore not 
always sources of instability that can stress the federation and lead it to fail. 
Sources of instability are only those that are likely to lead to breaking down, 
disintegration or splitting of the federation or the expulsion of one of its con-
stituents. Furthermore, change within a federal system is typically the result 
of a complex set of societal, institutional, and normative sources brought to 
bear by a “constellation of political actors.”15 It is therefore difficult to isolate 
a particular source of change or continuity. Lastly, the description, explana-
tion, and evaluation of federal dynamics must take into account the multidi-
mensional and multidirectional features of federal regimes.16 
Following an overview of this conceptual framework and the theoretical 
studies dedicated to the identification of sources of change and instability in 
federal systems, the aim of this Essay is to capture the actual dynamics of the 
Belgian constitutional system. As illustrated by Robert Lieberman, the dy-
namics of federal systems can be explained by driving forces existing in dif-
ferent layers of the federal systems.17 Sources of change and of instability 
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have various historical origins and carry varying logics that are not necessari-
ly connected with one another.18 Tensions exist between the societal, institu-
tional, and normative layers of the federal state; therefore, sources of change 
and instability can be explained by the interplay of those different layers of 
the federal state.19  
 This Essay first identifies the forces driving and contributing to the dy-
namics of the Belgian federal system. The Essay then examines the Sixth Re-
form of the State adopted in January 2014 and how it creates new sources of 
change in Belgian federalism. Lastly, in the final section, the Essay discusses 
the influence of European law on Belgium’s federal dynamic. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Linguistic, Social, and Political Bipolarity of Belgian Society 
The major sources of change in Belgium within the societal layer of the 
federal system lie in the linguistic, social, and political bipolarity of Belgian 
society.20 The main features of this layer of Belgian federalism are its linguis-
tic and political bipolarity, which serves as the main source of change, as po-
litical demands for reforms are aligned with this bipolarity. In Belgium, two 
large Dutch and French communities as well as a smaller German-speaking 
community coexist within the same state.21 According to recent statistics, 
6,251,983 individuals live in the Flemish Region (Dutch-speaking region) 
and 3,498,384 live in the Walloon Region (French-speaking region).22 Ap-
proximately 75,000 residents are German-speaking.23 Currently 1,089,538 
people reside in Brussels-Capital Region.24 Brussels is officially a bilingual 
city, although a majority of its residents speak French.25 Although the Dutch-
speaking population is the majority in Belgium as a whole, it is the minority 
in Brussels.26 In Belgium, therefore, the French and Dutch linguistic and 
communitarian poles dominate the political life of the country, even though 
                                                                                                                           
Lieberman, Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change, 96 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 697, 703 (2002). 
 18 Broschek, supra note 17, at 540; Lieberman, supra note 17, at 703. 
 19 Broschek, supra note 17, at 540; Lieberman, supra note 17, at 703.  
 20 See Swenden et al., supra note 1, at 869–70. 
 21 A Statistical Overview of the Belgian Population, BELGIAN FED. GOV’T, http://www.belgium.
be/en/about_belgium/country/Population/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
3TLT-B7D9. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Patricia Popelier & Bea Cantillon, Bipolar Federalism and the Social Welfare State: A 
Case for Shared Competences, 43 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 626, 629 (2003).  
 26 See Popelier & Cantillon, supra note 25, at 629; A Statistical Overview of the Belgian Pop-
ulation, supra note 21. 
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there are also other smaller regional and community units such as the Brus-
sels-Capital Region and the German-speaking Community.27 This linguistic 
bipolarity is strongly connected with the existence of a variety of opinions 
regarding national identity, particularly in multinational societies like Bel-
gium.28 These varying notions of national affiliation within the Belgian popu-
lation are an important source of change.29 
Political asymmetry that “arises from the impact of cultural, economic, 
social, and political conditions affecting the relative power, influence and re-
lations of different regional units with each other and with the federal gov-
ernment” is inherent to federalism.30 It becomes “a particularly serious source 
of tension” in the political dynamics of federations when “a single unit has 
contained over half the federation’s population” and the political asymmetry 
becomes tantamount to political bipolarity.31 In Belgium, linguistic bipolarity 
goes hand-in-hand with political bipolarity.32 According to Robert Watts, this 
configuration becomes “almost invariably a source of instability” and of 
change when half the population is contained within a single political unit.33 
Dyadic federations are dynamic and particularly susceptible to change and 
instability, especially in the case of binational federations.34 Watts contends 
that in these dyadic and binational federations, there is a problematic tenden-
cy to insist upon parity between the two major units in all matters because 
“there is no opportunity for shifting alliances and coalitions among the con-
stituent units or their representatives varying with different issues.”35 Moreo-
ver, the smaller entity invariably feels threatened when the larger one devel-
ops a “sense of grievance over the apparently undemocratic constraints im-
posed upon it in order to accommodate the smaller unit.”36 Like every do-
main of the political life, questions related to the recent economic crisis and 
resulting financial pressure tended to be analyzed in Belgium through the lens 
of this bipolarity. 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Popelier & Cantillon, supra note 25, at 628–30. 
 28 Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens & André-Paul Frognier, Does Belgium (Still) Exist? Differences 
in Political Culture Between Flemings and Walloons, 29 WEST EUR. POL. 912, 914–16 (2006).  
 29 See id. See generally John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Federation and Managing Na-
tions, in MULTINATIONAL FEDERATIONS, 180, 197–98 (Michael Burgess & John Pinder eds., 
2007) (discussing the importance of national identity).  
 30 RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS IN THE 1990S, at 57 (2d ed. 1996). 
 31 See id.  
 32 See Popelier & Cantillon, supra note 25, at 628–30; Billiet et al., supra note 28, at 913–14.   
 33 WATTS, supra note 30, at 57. 
 34 See Ronald L. Watts, Multinational Federations in a Comparative Perspective, in MULTI-
NATIONAL FEDERATIONS, supra note 29, at 225, 233–34. 
 35 Id. at 233. 
 36 Id. at 233–34. 
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The wide institutionalization of bipolarity is another major source of 
change that occurs at the interaction of the societal and institutional layers.37 
National political parties have been divided into regional political parties, 
which have strengthened regional agendas.38 The absence of national political 
parties, federal electoral district, and the organization of elections explains 
why representatives in the Federal Parliament only feel accountable to “their” 
French-speaking or Dutch-speaking voters.39  
The composition and organization of Belgian federal institutions mani-
fests the institutionalization of linguistic bipolarity.40 The members of the 
Federal Chamber of Representatives are divided in two “linguistic groups.”41 
The Senate remains partly organized on the basis of linguistic and communi-
tarian affiliations.42 The Council of Ministers is a joint body.43 French-
speakers and Dutch-speakers must be equally represented in the “Comité de 
concertation” (Consultation Committee),44 the “Conseil supérieur de la jus-
tice” (High Council for Justice), and on the Constitutional Court.45 Linguistic 
lines are clearly present in the public square because there is no national me-
dia outlet and the linguistic communities have been exclusively responsible 
for the media’s content since 1970.46 This institutionalized polarization of the 
political life and the public sphere is a major source of change and instability 
and a fertile ground for nationalist movements.  
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Patricia Popelier & Dave Sinardet, Stabiliteit en Instabiliteit in de Belgische Federale 
Staatstructuur, in BELGIE, QUO VADIS? WAARHEEN NA DE ZESDE STAATSHERVORMING? 6, 8–9 
(Patricia Popelier et al. eds., 2012); Billiet et al., supra note 28, at 913–15. 
 38 See Billiet et al., supra note 28, at 913–14; Pascal Delwit & Jean-Michel De Waele, Origi-
nes, Évolutions et Devenir des Partis Politiques en Belgique, in LES PARTIS POLITIQUES EN BEL-
GIQUE 7, 13–20 (Pascal Delwit & Jean-Michel De Waele eds., 1997). 
 39 See Dave Sinardet, Belgian Federalism Put to the Test: The 2007 Belgian Federal Elec-
tions and Their Aftermath, 31 WEST EUR. POL. 1016, 1016–17, 1031 (2008) (discussing formation 
of language-specific political parties and the lack of any national party). 
 40 See 1994 CONST. arts. 43, 67 (Belg.). 
 41 Id. art. 43. 
 42 Id. arts. 43, 67. 
 43 Id. art. 99. 
 44 Loi ordinaire de réformes institutionnelles [Ordinary Institutional Reform Act] of Aug. 9, 
1980, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 15, 1980, 9451. 
 45 See Loi spéciale sur la Cour d'arbitrage [The Special Institutional Reform Act] of Jan. 6, 
1989, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Jan. 7, 1989, 315, as amended by 
Loi spéciale portant modification de la loi du 6 janvier 1989 sur la Cour constitutionnelle [Special 
Law on Amendments to the Law of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court] of Apr. 4, 2014, 
MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Apr. 15, 2015, 32301; Marc Verdussen, 
Il Federalismo Asimmetrico in Belgio, in DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMPARATO ED EUROPEO 1172–81 
(2007) (discussing “sectioning” of federal Belgian institutions). 
 46 See DIDIER CALUWAERTS, CONFRONTATION AND COMMUNICATION: DELIBERATIVE DE-
MOCRACY IN DIVIDED BELGIUM, 59–74 (2012) (discussing processes of confrontation and com-
munication and on empirical studies on the deliberative democracy in divided Belgium); Billiet et 
al., supra note 28, at 914; Popelier & Sinardet, supra note 37, at 9. 
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The institutionalization of Belgian bipolarity is also present in the educa-
tional system, which is run exclusively by the communities.47 As a result, 
there is no bilingual education system as each community defines themselves 
by reference to a particular language.48 This is not only a source of change 
but certainly of instability, as “no democracy can function, it seems, without 
enough people from all corners of the demos being capable of talking to each 
other.”49 
These assertions about bipolarity, however, must be qualified. In addi-
tion to the gap between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking groups, there 
are other identities and other common projects emerging, mainly in the Brus-
sels-Capital Region and in the German-speaking Community. The aspirations 
and political projects of the Dutch and French-speaking groups, however, are 
sharply different. Thus, bipolarity remains a major source of instability in 
Belgian Federalism, mainly because it has been institutionalized and contin-
ues to entrench itself.50 Bipolarity is still the key element dominating each 
step of the Reform of the State. 
B. The Asymmetrical Nature of Belgian Federalism 
Traditionally, Belgian federalism is classified as either “devolutionary 
federalism,”51 “federalism by dissociation,”52 or as a “holding together” fed-
eration.53 The aforementioned institutionalized linguistic and political bipo-
larity has created a unique dynamic of dissociation.54 Subsequently, this dy-
namic of dissociation has produced a highly asymmetrical constitutional 
structure.55 As a result, great “differences in the status or legislative and ex-
                                                                                                                           
 47 See 1994 CONST. arts. 127, 130 (Belg.). 
 48 See id. arts. 129–130. 
 49 Philippe Van Parijs, On the Linguistic Territoriality Principle and Belgium’s Linguistic 
Future: A Reply, in THE LINGUISTIC TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE: RIGHT VIOLATION OR PARITY 
OF ESTEEM? 53, 72 (2011), available at http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-files/
ebooks/ebook-11/Re-Bel-e-book-11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SU74-43BM. 
 50 See Jean Beaufays et al., Fédéralisation et Structures Institutionnelles: La Belgique entre 
Refondation et Liquidation, in LA BELGIQUE EN MUTATION—SYSTÈMES POLITIQUES ET POLI-
TIQUES PUBLIQUES (1968–2008) 9, 22–23 (Jean Beaufays & Geoffroy Matagne eds., 2009); Billiet 
et al., supra note 28, at 913–14. 
 51 Lenaerts, supra note 4, at 206, 244. 
 52 Hugues Dumont, Le Fédéralisme Multinational Belge se prête-t-il à une Mutation 
Confédérale ? Les Onze Leçons d’un Fédéralisme Immature, in LE FÉDÉRALISME MULTINATION-
AL, supra note 1, at 177; Verdussen, supra note 1, at 211. 
 53 Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, 10 J. DEMOCRACY, 
19, 22 (1999). 
 54 See Verdussen, supra note 1, at 211; Billiet et al., supra note 28, at 913–14.  
 55 See Min Reuchamps, Structures Institutionnelles du Fédéralisme Belge, in LE FÉDÉRAL-
ISME BELGE: ENJEUX INSTITUTIONNELS, ACTEURS SOCIO-POLITIQUES ET OPINIONS PUBLIQUES 29, 
37 (Régis Dandoy et al. eds., 2013); Verdussen, supra note 1, at 211. 
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ecutive powers assigned by the constitution to the different regional units” 
exist in Belgium.56 
Asymmetry is horizontal—each federate entity presents unique features 
that distinguish it from others.57 These distinct features have been created on 
account of the complexity and the diversity of each situation and in order to 
guarantee protections for certain minority communities.58 In Belgium, com-
munities are federate entities that were first established by Dutch-speaking 
groups and are mainly concerned with culture, education, and personal mat-
ters.59 By contrast, regions, which were established in response to a Walloon 
claim for more autonomy in their economic policies and a fear they would be 
disadvantaged in the federal framework given the growing economic dispari-
ties favoring the North.60  
The resulting asymmetry is also reflected in the composition of the par-
liaments and the nature of the legislative norms each federate entity adopts—
ordinances in Brussels-Capital Region and decrees in the other regions. The 
constitutive autonomy that certain federate entities enjoy invites a deepening 
of the asymmetry between entities and the possibility of transferring some 
competences from certain federate entities to other federate entities.61 Asym-
metry between federate entities in the Belgian state is designed to allow the 
Brussel-Capital Region and the German-speaking Community to benefit from 
a higher degree of autonomy and protection.62  
Asymmetry is also vertical—there are some exceptional cases where the 
fundamental principle of equality between entities and of equipollence be-
tween the norms adopted by the federal and the federate entities is tempered 
by legal mechanisms which assume a kind of hierarchy between the different 
                                                                                                                           
 56 WATTS, supra note 30, at 60; see Reuchamps, supra note 55, at 37; Verdussen, supra note 
1, at 211.  
 57 See Verdussen, supra note 45, at 1172–81.  
 58 See Francis Delpérée La Complexité Fédérale, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE 
PACTET: L’ESPRIT DES INSTITUTIONS, L’ÉQUILIBRE DES POUVOIRS 117, 122 (2003); Francis 
Delpérée, Les Figures du Fédéralisme, 300 CAHIERS FRANÇAIS 93, 93 (2001).  
 59 See Lenaerts, supra note 4, at 241; Jan Velaers, Le Régime Linguistique en Belgique, Face 
aux Valeurs Constitutionnelles, in LANGUAGES, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND MINORITIES 115 (An-
dré Braën et al. eds., 2006) (describing how the political movement of the North was not only a 
battle for a language, but also a social and democratic battle aiming to ensure respect for the mid-
dle and upper classes of society). 
 60 See Wilfried Swenden & Maarten Theo Jans, ‘Will It Stay or Will It Go?’ Federalism and 
the Sustainability of Belgium, 29 WEST. EUR. POL. 878, 879–81 (2006).  
 61 See 1994 CONST. arts. 138–139 (Belg.); Raphaël Born, Bilan de L’Exercice des Compé-
tences Transférées par le Communauté Française, 1783–1784 COURRIER HEBDOMADAIRE DU 
CRISP 89–90 (2002). 
 62 Verdussen, supra note 45, at 1172–81.  
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levels of the Belgian federal state.63 Such constitutional asymmetry is likely to 
produce a kind of “evolutive” and complex federalism, which will permanent-
ly transform itself, given that it is torn between different entities that compete 
with each other. Most of the time, the source of the asymmetrical constitution-
al structure is the belief that it is the “only way to accommodate the varying 
pressures for regional autonomy.”64 This is the case for Belgium, where the 
two major political blocks do not share the same views on federalism.65 
C. The Consociational Process Existing Within Belgian Federalism 
Another source of change lies in the fact that Belgium is a “consocia-
tional democracy,” grounded on the idea that “sharing power between seg-
mental elites, instead of excluding minorities from power, is what turns cen-
trifugal tendencies into constructive forces for democratic stability.”66 In mul-
tinational societies where there is no Staatsvolk, theorists of federalism argue 
that the quality of the democracy instituted is often accompanied by the exist-
ence of a consociational federal form of government.67 The consociational 
form of the federal government has been a contributory force to Belgian fed-
eralism. Belgian constitutional law contains numerous provisions requiring 
consultation, cooperation, participation, and negotiation between different 
segments of the state.68 It also includes basic forms of federal loyalty, parity 
in the council of ministers, composition of the Senate, and some mechanisms 
of protection of minorities.69 Moreover, Belgian constitutional law also in-
cludes “the alarm bell procedure” that suspends the usual decision making 
procedure by transferring decision making authority to the Council of Minis-
ters whenever a linguistic group of the Federal Parliament or of the Parlia-
ment of the Brussels-Capital Region consider that its rights are or will be in-
fringed. The Belgian consitution also includes a similar procedure for resolv-
ing potential conflicts of interests, under which decisions that are alleged to 
threaten the interests of another level of power, cooperation agreements, and 
inter-ministerial committees are resolved according to procedure adopted by 
majority vote of each linguistic group represented in the Federal Parliament.70 
These consociational processes authorize change but in a deliberative way, 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Céline Romainville & Marc Verdussen, The Enforcement of Federal Law in the Bel-
gian Federal State, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU LAW AGAINST MEMBER STATES—METHODS 
AGAINST DEFIANCE (Andras Jakab & Dimitry Kochenov eds., forthcoming 2015).  
 64 WATTS, supra note 30, at 62. 
 65 See Swenden & Jans, supra note 60, at 884–85.  
 66 CALUWAERTS, supra note 46, at 59.  
 67 See McGarry & O’Leary, supra note 29, at 198–99. 
 68 1994 CONST. arts. 23, 127–128, 130 (Belg.). 
 69 Id. arts. 11, 67, 99, 143. 
 70 Id. arts. 54, 143. 
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guaranteeing a certain form of stability and crisis prevention.71 The coopera-
tive feature of Belgian federalism is also a source of constitutional change 
that is strengthened by the broad distribution of power and the recent rounds 
of “State Reform,” first initiated by the judiciary.72 The conclusion of cooper-
ation agreements, whether compulsory or optional, helps to solve major polit-
ical questions; however, cooperation agreements are not a neutral process 
because they reinforce the power of the executive, at the expense of legisla-
tive power.73 
D. The Permanent Reshaping of the Distribution of Powers Through the 
Constitutional Case Law 
Judges of the Constitutional Court and of the Legislation Section of the 
Council of the State have more than once instituted constitutional change 
through case law, often frustrating legislative attempts to preserve constitu-
tional norms that reflect delicate political agreements. The case of the elec-
toral district of Brussel-Hal-Vilvoorde provides an excellent illustration of 
constitutional case law being a source of instability within the Belgian federal 
system.74 This particular case is a major contributory force to political insta-
bility because the court’s decision has implicitly revised one of the major axi-
oms of Belgian constitutionalism: the principle of exclusivity in the distribu-
tion of powers, namely—the power of one authority excludes the power of 
another.75  
As Jurgen Vanpraet illustrated it, the exclusivity principle has been 
somewhat relativized by the diffusion of the “double aspect doctrine,” which 
states that two federate entities can both regulate a field on the basis of two 
different competences without that one entity exceeding its power, a principle 
known as the “exclusive exercise of parallel competences.”76 For Vanpraet, 
who developed the double aspect doctrine, two strict limits to the implemen-
tation of the doctrine should be established: (1) an indirect or direct link must 
                                                                                                                           
 71See id. arts. 11, 23, 54, 67, 99, 127–128, 130, 143; McGarry & O’Leary, supra note 29, at 
198–99. 
 72 Sébastien Van Drooghenbroeck, De la Révolution Copernicienne et des Nouvelles Forces 
Motrices: Considérations Diverses sur la Répartition des Compétences à l’aube de la Sixième 
Réforme de l’Etat, in BELGIE, QUO VADIS?, supra note 37, at 231, 250–54.  
 73 Johanne Poirier, Layered Social Federalism: From the Myth of Exclusive Competences to 
the Categorical Imperative of Cooperation, in SOCIAL FEDERALISM: HOW IS A MULTI-LEVEL 
WELFARE SATE BEST ORGANIZED? 16, 20–21 (Bea Cantillon et al. eds., 2011). 
 74 See Sinardet, supra note 39, at 1018–19.  
 75 See Patricia Popelier et al., On the Division of Power and the Belgian Layered Welfare 
State, in SOCIAL FEDERALISM, supra note 73, at 5, 7; Sinardet, supra note 39, at 1018–19. 
 76 JÜRGEN VANPRAET, DE LATENTE STAATSHERVORMING: DE BEVOEGDHEIDSVERDELING IN 
DE RECHTSPRAAK VAN HET GRONDWETTELIJK HOF EN DE ADVIESPRAKTIJK VAN DE RAAD VAN 
STATE 287, 297 (2011).  
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exist between the regulation and the issuing entities’ legislative competence, 
and (2) a cumulative application of both regulations must be possible.77 The 
influence of the double aspect doctrine on the Belgian judiciary is constantly 
reshaping the competences of each entity.78  
Most of the time, the application of the double aspect doctrine will favor 
the stronger federate entities on the political and economic level.79 The driv-
ing force is thereby clearly directed to those federate entities, in a centrifugal 
process. Moreover, the activation of the double aspect doctrine will almost 
automatically lead to conflict between Belgian norms, whose conflict restate 
the question of the hierarchy between the norms and of the efficiency of the 
conflict settlement procedures.80 Finally, the double aspect doctrine has trans-
formed the Kompetenz-Kompetenz question, the construction of which seems 
to have been transferred to constitutional judges.81 Indeed, Belgian constitu-
tional judges are, through the most recent Reform of the State, reshaping 
deeply the distribution of powers and some of the constitutional balances be-
tween federate and federal regional entities. Of course, the Constituting 
Chamber and the Federal Parliament, by way of “Special Laws,” retain the 
final word in this matter given that they can overrule to the constitutional 
modifications induced by the creativity of the constitutional judges.82 Based 
on these mechanisms, one could argue that the failure of these bodies to over-
rule the court signifies a tacit approval of the court’s “creative” actions, thus 
lending an air of democratic legitimacy to the Constitutional Court’s ac-
tions.83 The obvious problem, however, is that the possibility of such a reac-
tion by the democratic legislature is conditioned upon a certain degree of clar-
ity in the changes initiated by the case law. The exact scope, however, of the 
latest judge-led state reform remains often uncertain as the Constitutional 
Court does not seem to follow a clear path.84 
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E. Federalism, “Perfect Federalism,” and Confederalism:  
Ideas for Change 
At the federal normative layer, we find three different ideas mobilized 
by different political actors whose support change or destabilize federalism: 
federalism, “perfect federalism,” and confederalism. 
The first concept is simply federalism itself as a notion of shared sover-
eignty, which was achieved in Belgium in 1993 according to the Walloon 
political world, after the reforms of 1970, 1980, and 1988 initiated the reform 
process.85 Pressures for dismantling the vestiges of the unitary state in favor 
of full devolution to the communities and regions have not ceased with the 
adoption of the Fifth Reform of the State.86 In 1999, centrifugal forces in the 
North explain why five resolutions were adopted by the Flemish Parliament 
expressing the desire for stronger communities and a less powerful federal 
state.87 The Fifth Reform of the State of 2001 did not respond to all Flemish 
demands.88 Obviously, the idea that the Fifth Reform of the State achieved a 
politically satisfactory form of fully-fledged federalism, which was broadly 
accepted in the South, was totally disputed by the political elites of the North. 
Following 2001, the Flemish Parliament expanded its demands, specifying 
the competences and the main types of State Reform it required. In addition 
to those differences regarding the degree of federalism in Belgium, there are 
also great differences on the nature of federalism. The primary debate is 
whether federalism should be based on the two main communities, known as 
“federalism at two,” or on the three regions and the German-speaking Com-
munity, known as “federalism at four.” 
The invocation of a “perfect federalism” has also been an argument for 
deepening the Belgian federal system by reference to other federal systems 
such as those in Germany, Canada, the United States, and Switzerland. Under 
this conception of federalism, social security should not be in the hands of the 
federal authority because a model of “perfect federalism” implies that this 
field should be in the hand of federate entities. Even if one doubts the exist-
ence of a single or true federal model, the idea has had a powerful impact on 
Belgian political life.89 Another argument about “perfect federalism” relates 
to the implementation of Article 35 of the Constitution, which provides that 
“residual” powers should be accorded to the regions and communities but 
implementation of those powers should depend upon the adoption of a Spe-
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cial Law enumerating the powers of the Federation—a law that still does not 
exist.90 The notion is that a genuine federal state would transfer residual com-
petences to its federate entities.91 
Since 2003, the main demands for constitutional changes in Belgium re-
late to the concept of confederalism. The political parties in the North give 
priority to this concept.92 From analyzing the 2010 election results, 66 percent 
of the Dutch-speaking population support political parties with confederalism 
in their agenda.93 Deepening Belgian federalism in this way is connected to 
implementing Article 35 of the Constitution because the enumeration of the 
powers of the federal state constitutes a confederalist feature.94 Uncertainty 
remains, however, whether the confederalist structure created in the Belgian 
Constitution will resemble classic theories of comparative constitutional law 
or refer to something else.95 Within those theories, a confederalist system is 
an association of independent sovereign states that conclude an international 
treaty establishing a confederation to manage some limited questions in 
common.96 A classic example is the Commonwealth of Nations. Another fea-
ture of confederations, according to the classic theories of comparative consti-
tutional law, is the lack of a clear political link between citizens and the 
common structure.97 A last feature of most confederations is the existence of 
veto rights and a secession right for the members of the confederation. This 
last feature, however, is not shared by all confederations.98  
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Most of the Belgian political parties do not refer to the classical concept 
of confederalism.99 The Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (Christian Demo-
cratic and Flemish Party) (CD&V), which controls the Flemish Parliament, 
rejects the idea of an outright secession.100 It argues for an extreme form of 
federalism under the term of confederalism.101 The other major Flemish party, 
the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance) (NVA), has a more 
fundamental conception of confederalism that borders on separatism.102 Some 
of its member famously expressed the theory of the “virtual second,” of two 
separate states that would exist immediately before the creation of a Belgian 
Confederation.103 In any case, it remains clear that a genuine confederal hy-
pothesis would necessarily imply an “exit process out of the Belgian State”104 
and the death of the Belgian state: “een staat kan niet confederaal zijn” or, a 
state cannot be confederal.105 
F. The Centrifugal Forces Existing Among the Political Elites 
The most important sources of instability in Belgium act upon and 
through the political elite at the federal level, principally: the centrifugal forc-
es; the distrust between political parties of both communities; and the absence 
of commitment to the primary goal of the federation.106 The centrifugal forc-
es, using an institutionalized linguistic and political bipolarity which led to a 
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compartmentalization of culture and educational systems,107 are clamoring for 
more autonomy108 and are the major sources of change in Belgian federal-
ism.109 
The centrifugal forces are imbued with widespread distrust between the 
two poles of political life and are thus working towards separation.110 Belgian 
federalism does not proceed from the will to manage some matters together 
or to receive guarantees against the central power but on the contrary from 
the unwillingness and inability to work together. This is self-evident at each 
stage of the competences transfer from the federal state towards federate enti-
ties.111 This dynamic has continued to act upon Belgian politics, as illustrated 
by the recent Sixth Reform of the State.112 As a result of the centrifugal forces 
in Belgium, commitment to common fundamental values, or affectio socie-
tatis, is particularly hard to find in the political elites of Belgium who some-
times simply do not seem to share a common project.  
Theorists of multinational federalism, however, have shown that another 
major source of instability is the lack of “positive political or ideological 
commitment to the primary goal of the federation as an end in itself” among 
the political elite.113 The absence of such commitment “makes success im-
probable, if not impossible” and, on the contrary, for a federation to succeed, 
“the leaders, and their followers, must ‘feel federal’—they must be moved to 
think themselves as one people, with one common self-interest—capable, 
where necessary, of overriding most other considerations of small-group in-
terest.”114 Will Kimlycka similarly identifies an erosion of the sense of soli-
darity needed to promote justice and a common project as a source of insta-
bility.115 
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Moreover, it is quite striking to observe the dramatic expansion of the 
“communitarianisation” of all matters in cases referred to the Constitutional 
Court. This communitarianisation of all policies and questions appears to be a 
major source not only of change but also of instability. It also impacts eco-
nomic and financial questions, which are automatically read through a bipolar 
lens in terms of which party is the wealthier or the motor of the growth, in-
stead of analyzing questions in terms of cooperation. As such, the dynamics 
of “confrontation federalism” extends into economic questions. 
This political distrust in a context of centrifugal forces led to the Sixth 
Reform of the State.116 As usual, a single issue based upon political distrust 
became the focal point of the political debate, despite the limited nature of its 
impact on the territory. The Dutch-speaking political demands regarding a 
new State Reform and a separation of the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-
Vilvoorde (B.H.V.) faced a categorical denial from the French speaking polit-
ical elites for almost a decade.117 This prolonged impasse between French-
speaking and Dutch-speaking political elites regarding the B.H.V. case led to 
the longest political crisis of the history of Belgium after the elections of June 
2010 and ended only in December 2011, with the formation of the Di Rupo 
government.118  
B.H.V. was an electoral district that did not follow the delimitation in 
provinces, unlike the other electoral districts.119 This electoral district was the 
result of a complex compromise provided by law on December 13, 2002, that 
reorganized elections on the principle of the division in provinces.120 This 
reform aimed to keep the Brabant province divided into two electoral dis-
tricts, authorizing French-speaking inhabitants of the Brussels suburb, Flem-
ish Brabant, to give their voice to French-speaking candidates in Brussels and 
Dutch-speaking candidates to run for election not only in the province but 
also in Brussels.121 In Case 73/2003, the Constitutional Court, declared that 
the 2002 law treats candidates that run for election in the province of Brabant 
differently than candidates running for elections in other provinces.122 None-
theless, the court decided to maintain the effects of the law for four years.123 
Dutch-speaking scholars unanimously read the case as requiring a separation 
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of the electoral district of B.H.V. and a respect for the separation in provinces 
whereas French-speaking scholars reject the assertion of unconstitutionality 
and interpreted the extreme prudence in the vocabulary used as an obligation 
to justify the measures adopted.124  
Political negotiations to find a solution failed and elections of 2007 were 
organized according to the 2002 law. On November 6, 2006, the Dutch-
speaking MP’s of the Commission of Internal Affairs voted to separate the 
B.H.V. district but French-speaking political parties successfully suspended 
the adoption of the contested law by using constitutional tools: the alarm-bell 
process under Article 54 of the Constitution and the “conflicts of interests” 
procedure. In June 2010, elections were organized but their constitutionality 
remains questionable in light of the Constitutional Court judgment. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE & THE SIXTH REFORM OF THE BELGIAN STATE 
The first step of the Sixth Reform of the State was to find a solution to 
B.H.V.—a “false problem” that became the focal point of exacerbated bipo-
larity and distrust. The Sixth Reform, however, goes far beyond the simple 
pacification of these exacerbated tensions. Based on a revision of the consti-
tution and on the revision of the Special Institutional Act, this reform brings 
major changes to the constitutional structures of Belgium. The revision, how-
ever, does not address certain crucial elements of federalism such as constitu-
tive autonomy, a coherent distribution of power, or new mechanisms of coop-
eration and participation between federate entities.125  
To illustrate the paradox of the Sixth Reform of the State, this Essay fo-
cuses on the creation of a new source of change originating in the addition of 
a new constitutional amendment process by the Sixth Reform of State. Sec-
ond, the Essay focuses on the reform of the Senate, which could have brought 
new positive dynamics into Belgian federalism, but which remains deeply 
unsatisfactory. Third, the Essay analyzes the reform of the system of distribu-
tion of powers. 
A. The Implicit Addition of a New Constitutional Amendment Process 
To address the political crisis and to carry out the institutional and con-
stitutional reform, the eight Belgian political parties chose to distort Article 
195 in order to initiate an unusual constitutional amendment process. In the 
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name of securing the stability of the Belgian Constitution, the latter provision 
provides for an exceptionally rigid process.126 It implies the adoption of a 
“Declaration of Revision of the Constitution,” the dissolution of both cham-
bers, and the possibility for the newly elected chambers to adopt the revision, 
with each adoption subject to a double quorum of votes and of presence by 
each assembly.127 This rigid process aims to ensure the legislative chambers 
cannot modify a constitutional provision if it is not listed in a declaration of 
revision adopted by the previous legislative chambers, where each revision is 
also conditioned to a special quorum.128 This process has been heavily criti-
cized by the political elites and by the constitutional literature because it has 
the potential to obstruct political agreements that could not be anticipated by 
the previous legislature. Despite the fact that, in multinational federations, the 
temporality and quality of the responses to expressed demands for minority 
self-government is clearly an important source of change, Article 195 re-
mained exceptionally rigid.129 
In 2010, Article 195 was one of the constitutional provisions that could 
be amended by the previous legislature.130 The new parliament elected in 
2010 could thereby amend the revision process developed by Article 195 of 
the Belgian constitution.131 Yet, they chose another path. The political agree-
ment concluded by the eight political parties of the Di Rupo government re-
quired the modification of constitutional provisions that were not included in 
the declaration of revision of the previous legislature.132 To face this problem, 
the eight political parties of the majority inserted into Article 195 of the con-
stitution a “transitional provision” that authorized them to modify a posteriori 
the declaration of revision or, more precisely, to add a new amendment pro-
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cess to the existing one, which would be limited to the present legislature and 
to the content of the revision that could be made.133 The transitional provision 
enumerates a list of fifteen matters that can be revised at a qualified majority 
of two-thirds of the voters and on the condition that two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the chambers are present.134 Finally, this transitional provision estab-
lished that “the present transitional provision is not to be considered as a dec-
laration in the sense of Article 195, second paragraph.”135 
This transitional provision has attracted varied responses. Pierre Vander-
noot considers that if this provision is all but transitional, it remains constitu-
tional because the formal requirements of Article 195 have been respected.136 
Article 195 was enlisted in the declaration of revision and the double quorum 
of vote and of presence was respected.137 Further, Jan Velaers contends that 
the transitional provisions are not unconstitutional, even if they are unusual 
and not an example of beautiful logistics.138 The Venice Commission shares 
Velaers’ position, stating that the process did not violate international law or 
the rule of law.139 On the other hand, Popelier argues that the transitional pro-
vision is problematic because the object of the provision has been betrayed.140 
Marc Verdussen shares Popelier’s opinion and points out the risk of a de-
legitimation of the notion of “constitution.”141 Moreover, for a minority of 
constitutional scholars, this transitional provision violated Article 187 of the 
Belgian Constitution, which forbids any suspension of the constitutional 
text—an opinion that clearly does not stand up to rigorous analysis.142 There 
has not been any suspension, but rather a revision, and the prohibition on sus-
pending constitutional text does not apply to the parliament tasked with 
amending that very text. 
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The insertion of the transitional provision in Article 195 of the Belgian 
Constitution nevertheless demonstrates that, when tensions between the fed-
eral societal and political layer on a constitutional rigid structure became irre-
solvable and threatening, innovative and flexible solutions are found to re-
solve those tensions within constitutional constraints. To face the societal, 
political, and institutional driving forces, the political elites conjured up a le-
gal trick to circumvent one of the most rigid constitutional provision rather 
than revising it properly. This is an instructive lesson on the specific current 
dynamic of the Belgian constitutional system. 
B. The Reform of the Senate 
Where extreme political asymmetry exists in a federation, it has often 
induced efforts for corrective measures and the establishment of a “federal 
second legislative chamber with representation weighted to favour smaller 
regional units, and assisting less wealthy regional units by redistributive 
equalization transfers designed to assist those units.”143 The Belgian federal 
system designed in the Fifth Reform of the State functioned with two federal 
chambers, neither of which could be said to represent the interests of smaller 
regions.144 Since 2003, the successive declarations of revision of the constitu-
tion that were adopted have all referred to the possibility of reforming the 
powers and the composition of the Senate.145 
Indeed, the Sixth Reform of the State could have been the chance to re-
inforce cooperation and participation through the creation of a genuine feder-
al second chamber. The reform of the Senate provided by the revision of Jan-
uary 6, 2014, and a complex set of ordinary and “Special Laws,” however, 
remains frustrating. Indeed, the new Senate will be unable to fulfill the func-
tion of representing the different federate entities. 
One of the reasons the new Senate will not be able to adequately repre-
sent the different federate entities is the chamber’s unsatisfactory composi-
tion. The Belgian Senate is composed of sixty senators, none of whom are 
directly elected.146 Fifty are community or regional senators.147 Of those fifty, 
                                                                                                                           
 143 WATTS, supra, note 30, at 59–60. 
 144 See 1994 CONST. art 42 (Belg.). However, in both chambers, mechanisms were settled to 
protect the French-speaking minority at the federal level, especially in questions linked with bipo-
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 145 See Claire Fornoville, De Vlinder-Senaat, in DE ZESDE STAASTHERVORMING: IN-
STELLINGEN, BEVOEGDHEDEN EN MIDDELEN 17, 18–28 (Velaers et al. eds., 2014) (reviewing 
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 146 See 1994 CONST. art. 67 (Belg.). 
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twenty-nine are appointed by the Flemish Parliament or from the Dutch lan-
guage group of the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region.148 Ten mem-
bers are appointed by and from the Parliament of the French Community, 
eight are appointed by and from the Walloon Parliament, two senators ap-
pointed by and from the French-language group of the Parliament of the 
Brussels-Capital Region, and one senator is appointed by and from the Par-
liament of the German-speaking Community.149 The remaining ten senators 
are “co-opted senators,” meaning they are chosen by their elected peers in the 
Senate.150 This composition does not guarantee an adequate representation for 
the smaller communities: German-speaking and the inhabitants of Brus-
sels.151 
The Senate was designed as a weak institution because of its non-
permanent status and the limitations of its evocative power, therefore cannot 
guarantee participation and solidarity of all federate entities to the federal de-
cisions. 
C. Distribution of Powers 
The Sixth Reform of the State organizes the transfer of powers to feder-
ate entities and the deepening of the federal structure of the Belgian state by 
the creation of “homogeneous” package of competences transferred to re-
gions and communities, thus reinforcing the autonomy of those entities152 
Communities received extensive powers in the matters linked with persons.153 
Parts of social security, one of the flagships of the Belgian federal state, are 
transferred to regions.154 
The Sixth Reform of the State, however, still follows the traditional dis-
tribution of powers. This feature will certainly reinforce the latent reform of 
the constitutional system that is being led by the Constitutional Court and by 
the Council of State. The Sixth Reform of the State increases the extent of 
overlapping competences, resulting in potential ambiguities that could be fu-
ture sources of tensions. For example, the Sixth Reform of the State transfers 
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 148 See id. This means that, at a minimum, one of the six “Brussels” members of the Flemish 
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the control of the unemployed to the regions but keeps the legislation on un-
employment at the federal level. 
Finally, in general, the Sixth Reform of the State left untouched the in-
consistency and uncertainties of the distribution of power in some areas. It 
reaffirms the principle of exclusivity and of verticality in the distribution of 
powers. The permanent constitutional tinkering on the question of the distri-
bution of powers is likely to produce change but also instability, especially 
when there will be great differences between the political sensibilities be-
tween federal and federate governments. This tinkering also shows the im-
portance of judges in the Belgian constitutional system. Judges are a source 
of change who can adapt mechanisms to endogenous pressures and can inter-
pret constitutional rules to authorize changes. 
III. EUROPEAN LAW AS A SOURCE OF CHANGE 
In this part, this Essay aims to analyze the exogenous pressures exerted 
on the Belgian constitutional system by the economic and financial crisis in 
the Eurozone. The Essay will not discuss in detail the effects of the European-
ization on Belgian federalism, which are ambiguous and difficult to assess.155 
Instead, the Essay will focus on the effects of European reactions to the fi-
nancial crisis on the Belgian constitutional system. 
A. Neutrality of the European Legal Order: The Indirect Pressure Induced 
from European Obligations 
The European legal order is said to be neutral towards the internal or-
ganization of its Member States. Indeed, the European Court of Justice stated 
in Horvath v. Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs that 
“where the constitutional system of a Member State provides that devolved 
administrations are to have legislative competence, the mere adoption by 
those administrations of different standards for good agricultural and envi-
ronmental condition under Article 5 of and Annex IV to Regulation No 
1782/2003 does not constitute discrimination contrary to Community law.”156 
Advocate General Tsrtenjak confirmed that “each Member State is free to 
allocate powers, including legislative powers, internally as it sees fit and to 
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implement Community acts which are not directly applicable by means of 
measures adopted by regional or local authorities, as long as that allocation of 
powers enables the relevant Community legal measures in question to be im-
plemented correctly.”157 Under Horvath, the question as to which part of a 
Member State is to carry out a directive is not an issue of Community law, but 
is a matter that falls under the domestic allocation of competences.158 The 
reverse of this European neutrality vis-à-vis the organizational structure of the 
Member States is, however, that “to the same extent as a Member State is 
entitled to allocate its powers internally as it sees fit and as prescribed by its 
constitutional order, it is prevented from relying on domestic circumstances in 
order to circumvent its obligations under Community law.”159 
Despite apparent neutrality, the European legal order does exert indirect 
pressure on its Member States regarding the non-circumvention of their obli-
gation under Community law.160 This indirect pressure has led to subtle 
changes in the Belgian constitutional system. The first change relates to the 
principle of equality between each federal and federate entities. This equality 
principle has been tempered by Article 16, Section 3 of the Special Law of 
August 8, 1980, which authorizes the federal state to substitute itself for fed-
erate entities that have been identified as failing to satisfy its European obli-
gations.161 This repressive mechanism has a preventative dimension during 
Article 258 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) pro-
ceedings.162  
The second change prompted by indirect pressure from the European 
Union concerns the distribution of the power to induce federal and federate 
entities to conclude cooperation agreements. The Constitutional Court has 
already recognized the obligation to conclude such agreements in cases where 
the correct implementation of a European regulation was at stake in a case 
regarding electronic communications.163 Indeed, Jan Beyers and Peter 
Bursens state that “European integration encourages the federal level, the re-
gions and the communities to install cooperation mechanisms within the mar-
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gins of the constitutional provisions of Belgian dual federalism.”164 Further, 
“Europeanization mitigates or softens the dual nature of Belgian federalism 
and it has stimulated a gradual development towards more cooperative forms 
of formal and informal governance.”165 
B. Eurozone Crisis and the Golden Rule: The Direct Pressure on the Belgian 
Constitutional System 
The European responses to the economic and financial crisis applied a 
more direct pressure on the Belgian constitutional system. These mainly in-
tergovernmental responses were led by a belief in the necessity to coordinate 
between governments on questions linked to redistributive policies, in order 
to implement an effective general austerity policy.166 The major instrument of 
EU-mandated austerity policy is the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG or Fiscal Compact).167 Article 3 of the TCSG creates the 
obligation for each European Union member state to respect the “golden rule” 
of a balanced budget each fiscal year.168 
According to Article 3, Section 2 of the TCSG, the last golden rule 
“shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest 
one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding 
force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaran-
teed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary 
processes.”169 The national budgetary processes have the effect of reinforcing 
the powers of supranational institutions, representing clear exogenous pres-
sure for change in the Belgian constitutional order.170 
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2015] Belgian Federalism 249 
The way Belgian federate entities handled that pressure is instructive of 
the internal dynamics in Belgium. Following the advice of the Council of 
State on this question, and having ratified the above mentioned Treaty under 
conditions that may be incompatible with the Treaty, Belgian entities con-
cluded a cooperation agreement regarding the golden rule that aimed at shar-
ing the budgetary efforts. This agreement is a good example of a response to 
exogenous pressures in a context of important endogenous tensions. It devel-
ops an incompletely theorized agreement because it reaches an agreement on 
certain principles while leaving other issues undecided, such as enforcement 
in case one of the parties to the cooperation agreement does not comply with 
its terms.171 It can also be subjected to many interpretations, sometimes di-
verging.172  
CONCLUSION 
Since 2007, the economic and financial crisis has had a great impact in 
Belgium. The economic and financial difficulties caused by the crisis, how-
ever, cannot be considered the source of change in Belgium’s constitutional 
structure. Rather, the bipolarized reading of those difficulties and the polari-
zation of the debate on those questions (and many others) exert the major 
pressure on the Belgian constitutional system, in addition to a complex set of 
sources of change originating in European Union law. 
This Essay advocates that the dynamic of Belgian federalism is multi-
faceted. The current state of Belgian federalism is the result of several con-
tributory forces including the institutionalized societal and political bipolarity, 
through the asymmetrical nature of institutional architecture, through the con-
stitutional case law on the distribution of power, and through the centrifugal 
forces existing amongst the political elites. Many advocates behind these 
driving forces push for change to the constitutional system so that it more 
closely resembles “perfect federalism” or confederalism. It is striking that 
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parliaments no longer serve as centers of gravity for the actual dynamic of 
Belgian constitutionalism, as the recent reform of the Senate illustrates. In-
stead, the importance of constitutional case law has increased as well as the 
use of cooperative agreements, political negotiations coping with centrifugal 
forces, and recent European intergovernmental responses to the crisis. 
Moreover, it appears that neither the federal state nor the regions or the 
communities can qualify as a clear center of gravity of Belgian federal dy-
namic. As a result, there are multiple dynamics emanating from the regions, 
the communities and, sometimes, the federal state, mostly in response to the 
exogenous pressures of European Union law. 
These complex sources of change give rise to the ever-changing nature 
of Belgian federalism.173 The specific dynamic of Belgian federalism, how-
ever, will not automatically lead to a break.174 Pressures exerted on Belgian 
federalism could lead to a deepening of the federal structure as well as a re-
newed dialogue on the ties that still bind it together: democratic values and 
the common projects Belgians still want to share. 
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